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a b s t r a c t
Efficient access control with scalable rekeying is one of the most important requirements
for secure group communications, especially in a dynamic and large group. In a many-to-
many group communication environment, sender authentication is also another important
security requirement as each participant can potentially be both a sender and a receiver.
In this study, we propose an authenticated group communication scheme which is
secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack using identity-based signcryption.
The proposed scheme allows multiple senders to dynamically multicast messages into an
arbitrary group of receivers determined by the senders. In the proposed scheme, the group
member can be a stateless receiver. Data confidentiality of the group communication is
guaranteed as well as the sender authentication.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Multicasting is increasingly used as an efficient communication mechanism for delivering data to multiple receivers
in one-to-many or many-to-many group-oriented applications in the Internet or public broadcasting. Nevertheless, the
lack of security in the multicast communication model obstructs the effective and large scale deployment of multi-party
applications such as video conferencing, interactive group games, and broadcasting stock quotes.
Much research has been done into creating group key management schemes to meet the highly developed notion of
privacy and to control the access to multicast group communications. The secure multicasting is established on the basis
of a secret group key that is shared among the privileged users, but is unknown to non-group members. Generally, access
control can be achieved by encrypting the group communication using the group key. However, the difficulty of managing
cryptographic keys used for group communication arises from the dynamic membership change. Every time a member
is added to or deleted from a multicast group, the group controller must change the group key for backward or forward
secrecy [1]. Thus, changing the group key for a large number of subscribers in a scalable and reliable manner is one of the
most challenging issues in a secure group communication.
When a multicast system consists of multiple senders, it also raises an issue of message or sender authentication. In
many applications, receivers might need to verify themselves that a data packet was sent by the claimed sender and was
not modified illegally; a client must not accept a forged stock quote as authentic.
1.1. Related work
Fiat and Naor [2] introduced broadcast encryption. They suggested a method of securely broadcasting key information
such that only a privileged set of users can decrypt the information while a coalition of up to k other users cannot know
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anything. In broadcast key distribution, a central key distribution server is assumed to be able to authenticate and authorize
receivers, and send key information to them to achieve access control in a public broadcast. The key information consists of
a group key for decrypting the encrypted broadcast information as well as a set of key-encrypting keys (KEKs) for obtaining
a valid group key during any given time session. A problem with group key distribution is that of distributing KEKs to valid
members in a dynamic group so that they can securely update the new group key.
Two kinds of revocation schemes in the subset-cover framework are proposed in [3]: complete subtree (CS) and subset
difference (SD) schemes. When it is assumed that there are N stateless receivers and R revocations, CS and SD methods
require a message length of R log(N/R) and 2R − 1 keys respectively, which is the header size in the message. In addition,
CS and SD methods require a storage of O(logN) and O((logN)2) keys at the receiver, respectively.
In contrast, stateful algorithms such as logical key hierarchy (LKH) [4] and one-way function tree (OFT) [5] methods have
the advantage with regard to scalability for short rekeying messages of O(logN) keys while requiring a storage of O(logN)
keys at a user. These stateful key management approaches were built on a centralized logical key tree. Additionally, the
rekeying messages are encrypted using either an older version of the KEK or another KEK in the key tree. If a member goes
off-line and fails to receive any rekeying message, it may not be able to decipher messages from a future rekeying instance.
An authenticated identity-based multicast scheme from bilinear pairing was proposed by Wang and Wu [6], where
security is also provided. However, this scheme cannot guarantee the sender authentication as opposed to the authors’
claim. As the ciphertext is a MAC of the message, any group members can forge the messages sent from a group controller
pretending they are from the group controller. Lin et al. [7] also found that [6] is not secure against the insider forgery attack.
Mu et al. [8] proposed another identity-based authenticated broadcast encryption scheme. This scheme allows each
sender to dynamically broadcast messages to its group members using a polynomial function constructed with secret keys
of themembers. The groupmember can decrypt themessage using the identity of the sender and its secret key. This scheme
implicitly provides security against an insider forgery attack. However, it does not provide the mechanism of verifying the
signature or integrity of the message. Thus, it is not secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Another problem
is a header size in the message, which increases in proportion to the number of group members.
1.2. Our contribution
In this paper, we propose an identity-based authenticated multicast scheme in multi-sender network environment.
We resolve the sender authentication problem by using an identity-based signcryption framework [9]. Chosen ciphertext
security could be achieved by combining identity-based one-way encryptionwithmessage integrity (signature) verification,
without Fujisaki–Okamoto hybrid encryption [10]. Only the intended group members determined by a sender can obtain
themessage with their own secret keys even if they are stateless, and can be convincedwith the authenticity of themessage
with the public identity of the sender.
Furthermore, each user storage is reduced to O(1) in contrast to the tree-based key distribution schemes’ case. The size
of a rekeying message is O(n1 + nid)where n1 and nid represent the numbers of bits required to represent an element ofG1
and an identity respectively. Thus, it does not increase in proportion to the number of group members. Additionally, as a
member joining or leaving does not affect the other members in the group, scalability and dynamic group management are
enhanced.
2. Background and definitions
In this section, we briefly summarize the mathematical primitives necessary for pairing-based cryptography. Then, we
describe the identity-based signcryption along with the main security properties of the multicast system dealing with
notions of secrecy and authenticity.
2.1. Qualified pair and bilinear pairing
2.1.1. Qualified pair
The notion of qualified pair was first introduced in [6]. Let the prime decomposition of φ be φ = pk11 pk22 · · · pktt where pis
are prime and kis are integer (pi 6= pj for i 6= j). Then the pair (x′i, xi) is a qualified pair if x′ixi = xi mod φ. The qualified pair
can be constructed as follows: Let x′i = pkii and xi =
∏
j6=i p
kj
j + 1. Then (x′i, xi) is a qualified pair since x′ixi = φ+ xi = xi mod
φ, and there is no other qualified pair (x′j, xi) for j 6= i.
2.1.2. Bilinear pairing
Let G1 denote an additive group of order φ and G2 denote a multiplicative group of the same order. Then a map
eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is said to be bilinear if eˆ(aP, bQ ) = eˆ(P,Q )ab for all P,Q ∈ G1 and all a, b ∈ Z∗φ , and non-degenerate if
eˆ(P, P) 6= 1 for the generator P of G1.
Weil pairing [11] or Tate pairing [12] on elliptic curves can be used as an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear
map. There are efficient and practical ways to find such maps; see for example [13–15].
The security of a pairing-based algorithm is based on the Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Problem (BDHP) [11]:
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Definition 1 (Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Problem). Given 〈P, aP, bP, cP〉 for random choices of a, b, c ∈ Z∗φ , compute eˆ(P, P)abc∈ G2.
An algorithm A has advantage  in solving the BDHP if Pr[A(P, aP, bP, cP) = eˆ(P, P)abc] ≥ . We say that the bilinear
Diffie–Hellman assumption is satisfied if no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A can solve the BDHP with a non-
negligible advantage.
2.2. Identity-based signcryption
An identity-based signcryption scheme consists of Setup, Extract, Sign, Encrypt, Decrypt, and Verify algorithms.
The Setup algorithm produces global public parameters params, the master secret key s, and the master public key on
the input of security parameter 1k. Extract outputs a secret key of a user on the input of the master secret key and the public
identity of the user. A sender uses the Sign algorithm to produce a signature σ on the input of a message m with its own
secret key. Then, the sender uses the Encrypt algorithm to produce a ciphertext c , which is the encryption of m and σ with
its own secret key and the public identity of the receiver. The receiver uses the Decrypt algorithm to decrypt the received
ciphertext with its own secret key and producem, σ , and the identity of the sender. Then, the receiver verifies the signature
by checking whether σ is the sender’s signature on m using the Verify algorithm. If it is, it outputs >; and it outputs ⊥
otherwise.
Without loss of generality, when a sender with identity IDA whose secret key is KA sends a message to a receiver with
identity IDB whose secret key is KB, the transmission process has the following consistency requirements.
(1) (m, σ , r)← Sign(m, KA), where r is some ephemeral data.
(2) c ← Encrypt(m, σ , r, KA, IDB).
(3) (mˆ, σˆ , ˆID)← Decrypt(c, KB).
(4) IDA = ˆID,m = mˆ, and>← Verify(mˆ, σˆ , ˆID).
The signcryption should provide a method for encrypting and signing data together in a way that is more efficient than
using an encryption scheme combined with a signature scheme.
2.3. Security requirements
The main security properties of a secure group communication are secrecy and authenticity. Specifically, the security
requirements are considered to be of message confidentiality, ciphertext authentication, and signature non-repudiation.
We review the security models for identity-based signcryption proposed in [16,9].
2.3.1. Message confidentiality
Message confidentiality prevents outsiders or non-group members from decrypting the group message. It allows the
communicating parties to preserve the secrecy of their communications. The accepted notion of security with respect to
confidentiality for public key encryption is indistinguishability of encryptions under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
Message confidentiality is defined in terms of the following game, played between a challenger and an adversary.
Start. The challenger runs Setup(1k) and gives the resulting params to the adversary. It keeps the secret s for itself.
Phase 1. The adversary makes a number of following queries to the challenger in an adaptive fashion (i.e., one at a time,
with knowledge of the previous replies).
Sign/Encrypt. The adversary submits a message and two distinct identities (one is a sender identity and the
other is a receiver identity) to the challenger. The adversary obtains a ciphertext containing the
signature of the sender on the message, which is encrypted for the receiver’s identity from the
challenger.
Decrypt/Verify. The adversary submits a ciphertext and an identity of the receiver to the challenger. The
challenger decrypts the ciphertext under the secret key of the receiver. The challenger returns
the decrypted message, its signature, and the identity of the sender, provided that the resulting
decryption is a valid message/signature pair under the public key of the decrypted identity.
Otherwise, it returns⊥.
Extract. The adversary submits an identity, and obtains the corresponding private key from the
challenger.
Selection. At some point, the adversary outputs two distinct message {m0,m1}, a sender identity IDA, and a receiver identity
IDB. The adversary must have made no private key extraction query on IDB.
Challenge. The challenger flips b ∈ {0, 1}, signsmb under the secret key corresponding to IDA, and encrypts the result under
the public key of IDB to produce c. The challenger returns the ciphertext c as a challenge to the adversary.
Phase 2. The adversary adaptively issues a number of additional sign/encrypt, decrypt/verify, extract queries as in Phase
1. It is not allowed to extract a private key of IDB, or to make a decrypt/verify query for c under IDB.
Response. The adversary returns a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}, and wins the game if b′ = b.
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It is important to note that the adversary is allowed to know the private key of the sender, which gives us insider security
for confidentiality. This implies that confidentiality is preserved even if a sender’s key is compromised.
Definition 2. An identity-based signcryption (IBS) scheme is said to be semantically secure against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack, or IND-IBS-CCA2 secure, if an advantage Adv[A] = |Pr[b′ = b] − 12 | of any randomized polynomial-
time IND-IBS-CCA2 adversaryA is negligible.
In particular, secrecy is considered to be of two types in a secure group communication [1]: backward secrecy and forward
secrecy. Backward secrecy is used to prevent a new joining member from accessing messages exchanged before it joins the
group. If a new group key is generated and usedwhen a newmember joins, the joiningmember cannot decrypt the previous
messages encryptedwith the old group keys. Forward secrecy is used to prevent a leavingmember from accessing the group
communication after it leaves the group. If a group key is changed when a member leaves the group, the revoked member
is not able to decrypt the group communication thereafter.
Definition 3. An identity-based group key management scheme is said to be backward secure against any joining user if
the joining user cannot decrypt the previous group data exchanged before it joins the group.
Definition 4. An identity-based group keymanagement scheme is said to be forward secure against any revoked user if the
revoked user cannot decrypt the subsequent group data after it leaves the group.
2.3.2. Ciphertext authentication
Ciphertext authentication allows only the intended legitimate recipient to be convinced that themessage was encrypted
by the same personwho signed it. That is, an outside adversary cannot re-encrypt a signedmessage of the sender throughout
the transmission. This implies ciphertext integrity.
Ciphertext authentication can be defined by a game played by a challenger and an adversary as follows.
Start. The challenger runs Setup(1k) and gives the resulting params to the adversary. It keeps the secret s for itself.
Query.The adversary makes a number of queries to the challenger as in the game of Section 2.3.1.
Forge.The adversary returns a receiver identity IDB and a ciphertext c. Let (m, σ , IDA) be the decryption of c under the secret
key corresponding to IDB. The adversarywins the game if IDA 6= IDB; Verify (m, σ , IDA) = >; no private key extraction
query was made on either IDA or IDB; and c did not result from a sign/encrypt query with IDA and IDB.
The above experiment is a case of outsider security for authentication on the whole ciphertext since the adversary is not
able to extract the secret key corresponding to IDB. We call the above game an AUTH-IBS-CMA attack.
Definition 5. An identity-based signcryption (IBS) scheme is said to be existentially ciphertext-unforgeable against chosen
message outsider attacks, or AUTH-IBS-CMA secure, if an advantageAdv[A] = Pr[Verify(m, σ , IDA) = >] of any randomized
polynomial-time AUTH-IBS-CMA adversaryA is negligible.
2.3.3. Signature non-repudiation
Signature non-repudiation prevents the sender of a signcrypted message from disavowing its signature. It can be
also verified by only the intended recipient of the signcryption. The accepted notion of security with respect to the
non-repudiation is existential unforgeability (EUF) under adaptive chosen message attack [17]. This implies message
authentication and integrity.
Signature non-repudiation is formally defined in terms of the following game, played between a challenger and an
adversary.
Start. The challenger runs Setup(1k) and gives the resulting params to the adversary. It keeps the secret s for itself.
Query.The adversary makes a number of queries to the challenger as in the game of Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
Forge.The adversary returns a receiver identity IDB and a ciphertext c. Let (m, σ , IDA) be the decryption of c under the
secret key corresponding to IDB. The adversary wins the game if IDA 6= IDB;Verify(m, σ , IDA) = >; no private key
extraction query was made on IDA; and no sign/encrypt query (m, IDA, IDB′)was made that resulted in a ciphertext c ′
whose decryption under the private key of IDB′ is the claimed forgery (m, σ , IDA).
This model is very similar to the notion of existential unforgeability against chosen message attack [16,9]. We call it an
EUF-IBS-CMA attack.
Definition 6. An identity-based signcryption (IBS) scheme is said to be existentially signature-unforgeable against chosen
message insider attack, or EUF-IBS-CMA secure, if an advantage Adv[A] = Pr[Verify(m, σ , IDA) = >] of any randomized
polynomial-time EUF-IBS-CMA adversaryA is negligible.
In the above experiment, the adversary is allowed to obtain the private key of the recipient of the forgery, which
corresponds to the stringent requirements of insider security for authentication [16]. The insider security is defined in terms
of the game played between a challenger and an adversary where an adversary has access to any private key other than that
of the signer, and can query an oracle that signs anymessage but the challenge. We contrast the above experiment, which is
the case of insider security for authentication on the signed plaintext only, with the scenario for ciphertext authentication,
which required outsider security for authentication on the whole ciphertext.
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3. The proposed scheme
In this section, we propose an authenticated secure multicast scheme in a multi-sender network environment.
The proposed scheme is constructed by an identity-based signcryption framework [9], but expanded to the group
communication using a qualified pair property.
3.1. System description
We consider the network environment where there are a centralized key server and multiple multicast controllers. A
sender of a group is in charge of managing the group as a multicast controller. The key server generates public parameters
for the system and the keys for the network group senders and users.
Let G = {G1,G2, . . . ,Gs} denote the set of multicast groups, or services in the network. Let U = {u1, . . . , un} be the
universe of users. Let Sj denote the sender of Gj ∈ G, and Rj ⊆ U denote the set of members who can access the multicast
service Gj transmitted from Sj. For example, a member u1 ∈ R1 ∩ R2 can access the multicast services transmitted from S1
and S2 respectively. IDU represents an public identity of U . For example, IDSt and IDRj represent the identities of St and Rj
respectively.
Group membership may change from session to session. When a member joins or leaves a multicast group, a session of
the group changes and the multicast controller, or the sender of the group will rekey the group for backward or forward
secrecy.
3.2. Construction
We now describe the proposed authenticated multicast protocol. The cryptosystem in the proposed scheme makes use
of a bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 where G1 and G2 are cyclic groups of order φ.
(1) Setup
The key server chooses a generator P of G1 and a random s ∈ Z∗φ , and computes a master public key Ppub ← sP . The
key server keeps s as a master secret key. Then, the key server chooses cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗φ , H3 : G2 → {0, 1}∗ and publishes parameters params = {P, Ppub,H1,H2,H3}.
(2) Extract
The key server extracts QSj ← H1(IDSj) and computes the private key KSj ← sQSj , ∀Sj of Gj ∈ G. Likewise, the key
server extracts QRj ← H1(IDRj) and computes the private key KRj ← sQRj , ∀Rj of Gj ∈ G. Then, the key server sends the
private keys KSj and KRj to Sj.
Each sender Sj picks n qualified pairs (x′i, xi) for i = 1, . . . , n where n = |Rj|, and computes x = x′1x′2 · · · x′n. Then,∀ui ∈ Rj, the sender computes a secret key Kui ← xiKRj , i = 1, . . . , n, and distributes Kui to ui.
(3) Sign
For a sender Sj to sign m, it chooses r ∈ Z∗φ; computes U ← rxQSj , σ ← (rx+ H2(U ‖ m))KSj ; returns the signature
(U, σ ) and forwards (m, r,U, σ ) to Encrypt.
(4) Encrypt
For a sender Sj to encrypt m using (r,U, σ ), which are outputs of Sign, for its group members in Rj, it computes
QRj ← H1(IDRj), X ← eˆ(KSj , xQRj)r , and V ← (σ‖IDSj‖m) ⊕ H3(X). Then, Sj broadcasts ciphertext (U, V ) to its group
members.
(5) Decrypt
For a member ui ∈ Rj to decrypt the received ciphertext (U, V ) from Sj, it computes Y ← eˆ(U, Kui), σ‖IDSj‖m ←
V ⊕ H3(Y ). Then, ui forwards the identity of a sender IDSj , messagem, and its signature (U, σ ) to Verify.
The decryption is correct because
Y = eˆ(U, Kui) = eˆ(rxQSj , xisQRj) = eˆ(QSj ,QRj)rxxis
= eˆ(QSj ,QRj)rxs = X .
(6) Verify
For a member ui ∈ Rj to verify the signature (U, σ ) on message m, it computes QSj ← H1(IDSj), Z ← H2(U ‖ m).
Then, it checks whether eˆ(σ , P) ?= eˆ(Ppub,U + ZQSj). If true, Verify returns>; otherwise, it returns⊥.
The signing algorithm in our scheme is that proposed in [18] aswas the case in [9]. The encryption in the proposed scheme
is similar to the Boneh and Franklin BasicIdent encryption scheme [11]. However, it is different from BasicIdent in that the
message is encrypted with the sender’s secret key (rather than the master public key) and identity of the receiver group
which ismultiplied by group access control parameter x. Combinedwith the integrity check in signature verify algorithm, the
encryption algorithm in the proposed scheme is secure against adaptive chosen cipher attack as we will demonstrate later.
3.3. Dynamic membership operations
In a dynamic network environment, a user can join or leave several multicast groups at any time. On a membership
change in a group, the access to the group should be controlled in a way that guarantees the backward or forward secrecy.
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3.3.1. Key update
In the proposed scheme, the rekeying process is very simple. When a member ut joins a group Gj, the sender Sj picks a
qualified pair (x′t , xt) and sets x← x′tx. Then, it computes a secret key Kut ← xtKRj and sends the key Kut to ut securely.
When a member ut leaves a group Gj, the sender Sj revokes ut from Rj by recomputing x =∏ui∈Rj\{ut } x′i . As x′t is a divisor
of the group order, x′−1t is not uniquely defined; thus x has to be recomputed as we described. After the rekeying, the sender
sends its group data to the group members in Rj by encrypting it with the newly computed x.
3.3.2. Backward and forward secrecy
In this section,we prove the backward and forward secrecy against the joining and leavingmember in the group.Message
confidentiality against outside adversaries will be proved in Section 4.2.
Theorem 1 (Backward Secrecy). When a member joins a group, it cannot decrypt the previous group data exchanged before it
joins the group.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we suppose that a member ut joins a group Gj at a time instance tl. Let xold = ∏ui∈Rj x′i
before tl. Then, xold is updated to xnew ← x′txold at tl when ut joins a group Gj, where (x′t , xt) is a qualified pair for ut picked
by the sender Sj. ut receives a secret key Kut (= xtKRj).
Let the ciphertext exchanged in the group Gj before tl be (U, V ) = (rxoldQSj , (σ‖IDSj‖m) ⊕ H3(eˆ(KSj , xoldQRj)r)). If ut is
allowed to decrypt it, ut should be able to compute Y ← eˆ(U, Kut ) with its secret key Kut such that Y = eˆ(KSj , xoldQRj)r .
However, eˆ(U, Kut ) 6= eˆ(KSj , xoldQRj)r since xtxold 6= xold. This is because the qualified pair of ut is not an element that
composes the group access control parameter xold for the group data before tl. Therefore, a newly joining member cannot
decrypt the previous group data exchanged before it joins the group. 
Theorem 2 (Forward Secrecy).When a member leaves a group, it cannot decrypt the subsequent group data after it leaves the
group.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we suppose that a member ut leaves a group Gj at a time instance tl. The sender Sj revokes
ut from Rj by recomputing xnew =∏ui∈Rj\{ut } x′i when ut leaves a group Gj.
Let the ciphertext exchanged in the group Gj after tl be (U, V ) = (rxnewQSj , (σ‖IDSj‖m) ⊕ H3(eˆ(KSj , xnewQRj)r)). If
ut is allowed to decrypt it, ut should be able to compute Y ← eˆ(U, Kut ) with its previous secret key Kut such that
Y = eˆ(KSj , xnewQRj)r . However, eˆ(U, Kut ) 6= eˆ(KSj , xnewQRj)r since xtxnew 6= xnew. This is because the qualified pair of ut
is not an element that composes the newly updated group access control parameter xnew for the group data any more.
Therefore, a revoked member cannot decrypt the subsequent group data exchanged after it leaves the group. 
4. Protocol analysis
In this section, the proposed scheme is analyzed in terms of the performance and security. The performance of the
proposed scheme is analyzed and compared with those of the previous schemes in Section 4.1. Additionally, the security
analysis of the proposed scheme is given in Section 4.2.
4.1. Performance analysis
In this section, the performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed and compared with those of the previous key
management algorithms, and the advantages are identified. In the analysis, the performance is measured with regard to
the communication, computation, and storage overhead. Communication, computation, and storage overhead associated
with key updating are major performance criteria for key management schemes [1,4]. To measure the performance of the
proposed scheme, we define the performance measures as:
(1) Storage overhead: the expected number of keys stored by each member and sender.
(2) Communication overhead: the header size of encrypted messages transmitted by a sender.
(3) Computation overhead: the expected amount of encryption/decryption or sign/verification operations computed by
each member and sender.
Table 1 shows the comparison results. The notation used in Table 1 is as follows:
– n1: bit size of an element in G1.
– nid: bit size of an identity.
– nφ: bit size of an element in Z∗φ .
– m: message size in bits.
– k: key size in bits.
– C1, C2: the number of computations in G1, G2.
– Ceˆ: the number of computations of eˆ.
– E, D: encryption, decryption.
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Table 1
Performance comparison.
Scheme Communication Computation Storage
Member KDC Member KDC
CS [3] kR log(N/R) 2D (R log(N/R)+ 1)E k logN k(2N − 1)
SD [3] k(2R− 1) 2D 2RE k ( 12 log2 N + 12 logN + 1) 2k(N logN−N+1)
Wang’s [6] nφ + n1 +m 2(C2 + Ceˆ + D) C1 + C2 + Ceˆ + 2E nφ + n1 2n1
Mu’s [8] (N + 2)n1 + nid (N + 1)C1 + C2 + 2Ceˆ + D (N + 3)C1 + Ceˆ + E k kN
Proposed 2n1 + nid C1 + 3Ceˆ + D 3C1 + Ceˆ + C2 + E n1 2n1
nφ : bit size of an element in Z∗φ , n1: bit size of an element inG1 , nid: bit size of an identity, C1 , C2: the number of computations inG1 andG2 , Ceˆ: the number
of computations of eˆ,m: message size in bits, k: key size in bits, R: # of revoked members, N: # of group members.
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Fig. 1. The number of users in the network.
– R: the number of revoked members.
– N: the number of group members.
In the communication overhead analysis, only the header size of the encryptedmessage is included in the analysis result.
The header consists of signature, random parameters, or secret keys other than the encrypted group message itself.
We simulate and compare the communication cost of each scheme. In this simulation, we consider group applications
on the Internet such as IPTV. Thus, the simulation is performed in the multicast backbone (MBone) network [19]. MBone is
a network integrated into the global Internet. It supports one-to-many delivery of real timemultimedia data between hosts
who connected with MBone. [19] showed that the number of users joining a multicast group follows a Poisson distribution
with rate λ, and the membership duration time follows an exponential distribution with a mean duration 1/µ when the
duration time is short.
We set the inter-arrival time between users as 10 s and the average membership duration time as 20 min. Fig. 1shows
the number of users in the network during 300 min. The solid line and dotted line represent the number of current users
and revoked users in the network respectively at the current time. On the basis of the membership distribution in Fig. 1, we
measured the communication cost of each scheme.
Fig. 2 shows the total communication cost of each scheme in theMBone network. In this simulation, we set k = 128,m =
215, nid = 12, nφ = 512, n1 = 512 bits. They are measured in bits during 120 min on the basis of the membership
distribution in Fig. 1. As is shown, the proposed scheme requires the least communication overhead in contrast to the
other pairing-based schemes [6,8] which require the communication cost in proportion to the number of groupmembers or
multicast data size; or the other subset-cover-based schemes CS, SD [3]which require the communication cost in proportion
to the number of revoked group members.
4.2. Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of each scheme. The analysis results are summarized and compared in Table 2.
The security is analyzed in terms of the data confidentiality, integrity, sender authentication, and backward/forward secrecy.
The 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the first row in Table 2 refer to them in that order.
We provide the security properties of the proposed scheme with regard to the security requirements defined in
Section 2.3. All the results are relative to the BDHP. To prove our results, we model H1,H2, and H3 as random oracles. We
assume that the adversary makes qi queries to Hi for i = 1, 2, 3. The number of sign/encrypt and decrypt/verify queries
made by the adversary are denoted by qs and qd respectively. Due to the space constraints, the corresponding proofs are
given in the Appendix.
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Fig. 2. Communication cost in the MBone network.
Table 2
Security comparison.
Scheme Message confidentiality Integrity Sender authentication Backward/forward secrecy
CS [3] Yes No No Forward
SD [3] Yes No No Forward
Wang [6] Yes Yes No Backward/forward
Mu [8] Yes No Yes Backward/forward
Proposed Yes Yes Yes Backward/forward
4.2.1. Message confidentiality
Theorem 3. If there is an IND-IBS-CCA2 adversaryA of IBS that succeeds with probability , then there is a simulator B running
in polynomial time that solves the BDHP with probability at least
 ·
(
1− qs(q2 + qs)
φ
)
· 1
q1q3
.
4.2.2. Ciphertext authentication
Theorem 4. If there is an AUTH-IBS-CMA adversaryA of IBS that succeeds with probability , then there is a simulator B running
in polynomial time that solves the BDHP with probability at least
 ·
(
1− qs(q2 + q3 + 2qs)
φ
)
· 1
q1(q1 − 1)(qs + qd)(q3 + qs) .
4.2.3. Signature non-repudiation
Theorem 5. If there is an EUF-IBS-CMA adversaryA of IBS that succeeds with probability , then there is a simulator B running
in polynomial time that solves the BDHP with probability at least
 ·
(
1− qs(q2 + qs)
φ
)2
· 1
4q21(q2 + qs)2
.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an identity-based authenticated multicast scheme in a multi-sender network environment.
The proposed scheme resolves the sender authentication problem by using identity-based signcryption. It also guarantees
chosen ciphertext securitywhile requiring less performance overhead than the previous pairing-based schemeswith regard
to the communication, computation, and storage. The group members can be stateless receivers in their multicast group
communications.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We will show how an IND-IBS-CCA2 adversaryAmay be used to construct a simulatorB that solves the BDHP. Let
(P, aP, bP, cP) be the instance of the BDHP.
We now describe the construction of the simulator B. B runs A with master public key Ppub ← bP . To maintain
consistency between queries made byA, the simulator keeps the following lists: Li for i = 1, 2, 3 for query/response pairs
to random oracle Hi; Ls for signcryptions generated by the simulator; and Ld for the queries made byA to the decrypt/verify
oracle. We describe howB runs Phase 1 ofA’s attack.
Simulator: H1(IDT )
At the beginning of the simulation, iα is chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , q1}. We assume thatA does not make
repeat queries. We show how to respond to the i-th query made byA:
(1) If i = iα , respond with H1(IDT )← aP and set IDα ← IDT .
(2) Else, choose r uniformly at random from Z∗φ; compute QT ← rP; compute KT ← rPpub; store (IDT ,QT , KT , r) in L1 and
respond with QT .
Simulator: H2(U ‖ m)
(1) If (U ‖ m, h2) ∈ L2 for some h2, return h2.
(2) Else, choose h2 uniformly at random from Z∗φ; add (U ‖ m, h2) to L2 and return h2.
Simulator: H3(X)
(1) If (X, h3) ∈ L3 for some h3, return h3.
(2) Else, choose h3 uniformly at random from {0, 1}∗; add (X, h3) to L3 and return h3.
Simulator: Extract (IDT )
We assume thatAmakes the query H1(IDT ) before it makes the extraction query for IDT .
(1) If IDT = IDα , abort the simulation.
(2) Else, search L1 for the entry (IDT ,QT , KT , r) corresponding to IDT and return KT .
Simulator: Sign/Encrypt (m, ID1, ID2)
We assume that A makes the queries H1(ID1) and H1(ID2) before it makes a sign/encrypt query using these identities.
We have the following two cases to consider.
• Case 1: ID1 6= IDα
(1) Find the entry (ID1,Q1, K1, r) in L1.
(2) Choose r ′ uniformly at random from Z∗φ and compute U ← r ′Q1.
(3) Compute h2 ← H2(U ‖ m).
(4) Compute σ ← (r ′ + h2)K1.
(5) Compute Q2 ← H1(ID2) and X ← eˆ(K1,Q2)r ′ .
(6) Compute V ← (σ‖ID1‖m)⊕ H3(X).
(7) Return (U, V ).
• Case 2: ID1 = IDα
(1) Choose r ′, h2 uniformly at random from Z∗φ .
(2) Compute U ← r ′P − h2aP and σ ← r ′Ppub.
(3) Add (U ‖ m, h2) to L2.
(4) Find the entry (ID2,Q2, K2, r) in L1.
(5) Compute X ← eˆ(U, K2).
(6) Compute V ← (σ‖IDα‖m)⊕ H3(X).
(7) Return (U, V ).
Simulator: Decrypt/Verify ((U, V ), ID2)
We assume thatAmakes the query H1(ID2) before it makes a decrypt query using this identity. We have the following
two cases to consider.
• Case 1: ID2 6= IDα
(1) Find the entry (ID2,Q2, K2, r) in L1.
(2) Compute X ← eˆ(U, K2).
(3) If X 6∈ L3, return⊥; else, σ‖ID1‖m← V ⊕ H3(X).
(4) If ID1 = ID2 or ID1 6∈ L1, return⊥; else, Q1 ← H1(ID1).
(5) If U ‖ m ∈ L2, return⊥; else, h2 ← H2(U ‖ m).
(6) If eˆ(σ , P) 6= eˆ(Ppub,U + h2Q1), return⊥; else, returnm, (U, σ ), ID1.
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• Case 2: ID2 = IDα
(1) Step through the list L3 with entries (X, h3) as follows.
(a) Compute σ‖ID1‖m← V ⊕ h3.
(b) If ID1 = IDα , move to the next element in L3 and begin again.
(c) If ID1 ∈ L1, let Q1 ← H1(ID1) and find K1 in L1; else, move to the next element in L3 and begin again.
(d) If U ‖ m ∈ L2, let h2 ← H2(X ‖ m); else move to the next element in L3.
(e) Check that X = eˆ(σ − h2K1, aP) and if not move to the next element in L3 and begin again.
(f) Check that eˆ(σ , P) = eˆ(Ppub,U + h2Q1). If true, returnm, (U, σ ), ID1; else move to the next element in L3.
(2) If no message has been returned after stepping through L3, return⊥.
At the end of Phase 1, the adversary outputs two identities {IDA, IDB} and two messages {m0,m1}. If IDB 6= IDα ,B aborts
the simulation. Otherwise, it chooses V ′ ← {0, 1}∗ and sets U ′ ← cP . It returns the challenge ciphertext (U ′, V ′) toA. The
queries made byA in Phase 2 are responded to in the same way as those made byA in Phase 1.
At the end of Phase 2, the simulator searches L1 for the entry (IDA,QA, KA, ra), chooses a random X from L3, and returns
X ra
−1
as its guess for the solution to the BDHP for (P, aP, bP, cP).
Now we consider how the simulation could fail when it executes Phase 1 ofA’s attack. It is clear that the simulations of
H1,H2, and H3 are indistinguishable from genuine random oracles.
We first consider how the simulation for sign/encryption could fail. The only possibility for the failure is defining
H2(U ‖ m) when it is already defined. Since U takes its value uniformly at random in 〈P〉, the probability of one of these
events occurring is at most (q2 + qs)/φ for each query. The qs comes from the fact that the sign simulator adds elements to
L2. Thus, over the whole simulation, the chance of a failure introduced in this way is at most
qs(q2 + qs)/φ. (1)
Another simulator to consider is the extract simulator. We see that the H1 simulator chooses one H1 query made by the
adversary and responds with group elements from the BDHP instance that it tries to solve. The simulator hopes that this
will be the identity chosen by the adversary for the recipient in the challenge. This will be the case with probability at least
1/q1. (2)
If this is not the case, whichmeans the adversary tried to extract the private key for this identity, the simulator would abort.
Next, we consider what failures there could be when B executes Phase 2 of A. All the same failures are possible; in
addition the simulator will fail ifAmakes the H3 query X = eˆ(P, P)raabc . However, ifA has any advantage it must make this
query, and once it has done so we have trapped it into leaving enough information in L3 to solve the BDHP with probability
1/q3. From this combined with (1) and (2), we conclude thatB succeeds with probability at least
 ·
(
1− qs(q2 + qs)
φ
)
· 1
q1q3
.  (3)
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We will show how an AUTH-IBS-CMA adversary A of IBS may be used to construct a simulator B that solves the
BDHP for (P, aP, bP, cP).
The simulator runs A with Ppub ← cP . It keeps lists L1, L2, L3 as in the proof of Theorem 1. We first describe how the
simulator runs Phase 1 ofA’s attack.
Simulator: H1(IDT )
At the beginning of the simulation, ia, ib (6= ia) are chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , q1}. We assume that A
does not make repeat queries. We show how to respond to the i-th query made byA as follows.
(1) If i = ia, respond with H1(IDT )← aP and set IDA ← IDT .
(2) If i = ib, respond with H1(IDT )← bP and set IDB ← IDT .
(3) Else, choose r uniformly at random from Z∗φ; compute QT ← rP; compute KT ← rPpub; store (IDT ,QT , KT , r) in L1 and
respond with QT .
Simulator: H2(U ‖ m) and H3(X)
Use the simulators H2(U ‖ m) and H3(X) in the proof of Theorem 1.
Simulator: Extract (IDT )
We assume thatAmakes the query H1(IDT ) before it makes the extraction query for IDT .
(1) If IDT = IDA or IDT = IDB, abort the simulation.
(2) Else, search L1 for the entry (IDT ,QT , KT , r) corresponding to IDT and return KT .
Simulator: Sign/Encrypt (m, ID1, ID2)
We assume that A makes the queries H1(ID1) and H1(ID2) before it makes a sign/encrypt query using these identities.
We have the following five cases to consider. H1,H2,H3 are the simulators above.
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• Case 1: ID1 6= IDA and ID1 6= IDB
Use the simulator from Case 1 of sign/encrypt in the proof of Theorem 1.
• Case 2: ID1 = IDA, ID2 6= IDA, and ID2 6= IDB
Use the simulator from Case 2 of sign/encrypt in the proof of Theorem 1 replacing aP with QA, and IDα with IDA.
• Case 3: ID1 = IDB, ID2 6= IDA, and ID2 6= IDB
Use the simulator from Case 2 replacing (IDA,QA)with (IDB,QB).
• Case 4: ID1 = IDA and ID2 = IDB
(1) Follow the first four steps of Case 2.
(2) Choose h3 ← {0, 1}∗ at random.
(3) Compute V ← (σ‖IDA‖m)⊕ h3.
(4) Add (IDA, IDB,U, V , σ , r ′, h2, h3) to Ls.
(5) Return (U, V ).
• Case 5; ID1 = IDB and ID1 = IDA
Use the simulator from Case 4 replacing (IDA,QA, IDB)with (IDB,QB, IDA).
Simulator: Decrypt/Verify (U, V , ID2)
We assume thatAmakes the query H1(ID2) before it makes a decrypt query for ID2. We have the following three cases
to consider.
• Case 1: ID2 6= IDA and ID2 6= IDB
(1) Find the entry (ID2,Q2, K2, r) in L1, compute X ← eˆ(U, K2), and initialize b← 1.
(2) If X ∈ L3, compute σ‖ID1‖m← V ⊕ H3(X); else b← 0.
(3) If b = 1 and ID1 ∈ L1, let Q1 ← H1(ID1); else b← 0.
(4) If b = 1 and U ‖ m ∈ L2, let h2 ← H2(U ‖ m); else b← 0.
(5) If b = 1 and eˆ(σ , P) = eˆ(Ppub,U + h2Q1), returnm, (U, σ ), and ID1; else step through the list Ls as follows.
(a) If the current entry has the form (IDA, IDB,U ′, V , σ ,m′, r ′, h′2, h3), test whether eˆ(U ′,QB) = eˆ(U, rP). If true,
continue; else move to the next element of Ls and begin again.
(b) If the current entry has the form (IDB, IDA,U ′, V , σ ,m′, r ′, h′2, h3), test whether eˆ(U ′,QA) = eˆ(U, rP). If true,
continue; else move to the next element of Ls and begin again.
(c) Compute σ‖ID1‖m← V ⊕ h3.
(d) If ID1 = ID2, move to the next element in Ls and begin again.
(e) If ID1 ∈ L1, let Q1 ← H1(ID1); else move to the next element in Ls.
(f) If U ‖ m ∈ L2, let h2 ← H2(U ‖ m); else move to the next element in Ls.
(g) Check that eˆ(σ , P) = eˆ(Ppub,U + h2Q1). If true, returnm, (U, σ ), and ID1; else move on to the next element in Ls
and begin again.
(6) If no message has been returned, return⊥.
• Case 2: ID2 = IDB
(1) If (IDA, IDB,U, V , σ ,m, r ′, h2, h3) ∈ Ls for somem, returnm, (U, σ ), IDA.
(2) Else, add (U, V ), IDB to Ld and step through the list L3 with entries (X, h3) as follows.
(a) Compute σ‖ID1‖m← V ⊕ h3.
(b) If ID1 = IDA or ID1 = IDB, move to the next element in L3 and begin again.
(c) If ID1 ∈ L1, let Q1 ← H1(ID1) and find K1 in L1; else move to the next element in L3 and begin again.
(d) If U ‖ m ∈ L2, let h2 ← H2(U ‖ m); else move to the next element in L3 and begin again.
(e) Check that X = eˆ(σ − h2K1,QB). If not, move to the next element in L3 and begin again.
(f) Check that eˆ(σ , P) = eˆ(Ppub,U + h2Q1). If so, returnm, (U, σ ), and ID1; else move to the next element in L3 and
begin again.
(3) If no message has been returned after stepping through the list L3, step through the list Ls as follows.
(a) If the current entry has the form (IDA, IDB,U ′, V , σ ,m′, r ′, h′2, h3) then check that U ′ = U . If so continue, else
move to the next element of Ls and begin again.
(b) If the current entry has the form (IDB, IDA,U ′, V , σ ,m′, r ′, h′2, h3) then check that eˆ(U ′,QA) = eˆ(U,QB). If so
continue, else move to the next element of Ls and begin again.
(c) Compute σ‖ID1‖m← V ⊕ h3.
(d) If ID1 = IDB, move to the next element in Ls and begin again.
(e) If ID1 ∈ L1, let Q1 ← H1(ID1); else move to the next element in Ls.
(f) If U ‖ m ∈ L2, let h2 ← H2(U ‖ m); else move to the next element in Ls.
(g) Check that eˆ(σ , P) = eˆ(Ppub,U + h2Q1). If so, returnm, (U, σ ), and ID1; else move to the next element in Ls and
begin again.
(4) If no message has been returned, return⊥.
• Case 3: ID2 = IDA
Use the above Case 2 replacing (IDB,QB, IDA)with (IDA,QA, IDB).
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Now we consider how our simulation could fail. It is clear that the simulations for H1 and H2 are indistinguishable from
real random oracles. However, the H3 simulator is not only defined at points where the H3 is called by A or the simulator
itself, but also defined at certain points implicitly by the sign/encrypt simulator.
Let us consider how the simulation for sign/encrypt could fail. We denote this event as SR. The only possibilities for
introducing a failure here are defining H2(U ‖ m)when it is already defined, or defining H3(eˆ(U, KB)) or H3(eˆ(U, KA))when
it is already defined. Since U takes its value uniformly at random in 〈P〉, the chance of one of these events occurring is at
most (q2 + q3 + 2qs)/φ for each query. Thus, the chance of a failure introduced in this way over the whole simulation is at
most
qs(q2 + q3 + 2qs)/φ. (4)
Next we consider the decrypt/verify simulator. There is possibility that it rejects a valid encryption (in Case 2 and 3).
Suppose that we try to decrypt (U, V ), IDB in Case 2. The failure will only occur if while stepping through L3 there is an entry
(X, h3) such that σ‖IDA‖m← V ⊕ h3 and (U, V ) is a valid encryption ofm from IDA to IDB. In this case we should have
X = eˆ(σ − h2KA,QB) = eˆ(σ ,QB) · eˆ(−h2KA,QB)
= eˆ(σ , bP) · (−h2acP, bP),
where h2 = H2(U ‖ m). From this, we can compute
eˆ(P, P)abc = (X/eˆ(σ , bP))−1/h2 . (5)
This is same as for Case 3 when we replace IDA, IDB with IDB, IDA respectively.
The last simulator thatwe consider is the extract simulator. The adversarywill only succeed in its taskwith non-negligible
probability if it queries H1 with the two identities under which the encrypted and signed message that it produces is
supposed to be valid.H1 simulator chooses twoH1 queriesmade by the adversary and responds to thesewith group elements
from the BDH instance that it is trying to solve. The simulator hopes that these will be the identities for the adversary’s
encrypted and signed message. This will be the case with probability at least
1/q1(q1 − 1). (6)
If this is not the case, a failure would occur in the extract simulator. We denote this event as ER.
Once A has been run, B does one of two things (assuming the worst case scenario, i.e. |Ls| = qs and |Ld| = qd): (1)
with probability qs(qs + qd), choose a random element from Ls and a random element (X, h3) from L3, (2) with probability
qd(qs + qd), choose a random element from Ld and a random element (X, h3) from L3. With the events described above, we
have
Adv[B] ≥  · Pr[¬ER ∧ ¬SR] · 1
(qs + qd)(q3 + qs) . (7)
Finally, using (4), (6) and (7), we have
Adv[B] ≥  ·
(
1− qs(q2 + q3 + 2qs)
φ
)
· 1
q1(q1 − 1)(qs + qd)(q3 + qs) .  (8)
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We will show how an EUF-IBS-CMA adversary A may be used to construct a simulator B that solves the
Diffie–Hellman problem for (P, aP, bP). The simulator runs A with master public key Ppub ← bP . It keeps lists L1, L2, L3
as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Simulator: H1(IDT )
At the beginning of the simulation, ia is chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , q1}. We assume thatA does not make
repeat queries. We show how to respond to the i-th query made byA:
(1) If i = ia, respond with H1(IDT )← aP and set IDA ← IDT .
(2) Else, choose r uniformly at random from Z∗φ; compute QT ← rP; compute KT ← rPpub; store (IDT ,QT , KT , r) in L1 and
respond with QT .
Simulator: H2(U ‖ m) and H3(X)
Use the simulators H2(U ‖ m) and H3(X) in the proof of Theorem 1.
Simulator: Extract (IDT )
Use the simulator Extract in the proof of Theorem 1 replacing IDα with IDA.
Simulator: Sign/Encrypt (m, ID1, ID2)
We assume that A makes the queries H1(ID1) and H1(ID2) before it makes a sign/encrypt query using these identities.
We have the following two cases.
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• Case 1: ID1 6= IDA
Use the simulator from Case 1 of sign/encrypt in the proof of Theorem 1.
• Case 2: ID1 = IDA
Use the simulator from Case 1 of sign/encrypt in the proof of Theorem 2.
Simulator: Decrypt/Verify ((U, V ), ID2)
We assume thatAmakes the query H1(ID2) before it makes a decrypt query using this identity. We have the following
two cases to consider.
• Case 1: ID2 6= IDA
Use the simulator from Case 1 of decrypt/verify in the proof of Theorem 1.
• Case 2: ID2 = IDA
Use the simulator from Case 2 of decrypt/verify in the proof of Theorem 1 replacing IDα with IDA, and replacing aP with
QA.
Now we consider how the simulation could fail. Clearly, the simulations for H1,H2, and H3 are indistinguishable from
real random oracles.
We first consider how the simulation for sign/encryption could fail. The analysis of this case is identical to that of the
case in Theorem 1. Therefore, a failure is introduced with probability at most
qs(q2 + qs)/φ. (9)
The next simulator that we consider is the extract simulator. The adversary will only succeed in its task with non-
negligible probability if it queriesH1 with the identity under which themessage contained in the ciphertext that it returns is
signed.We see that theH1 simulator chooses oneH1 querymade by the adversary and responds to this with group elements
from the BDH instance that it tries to solve. The simulator hopes that this will be the signer identity for the ciphertext that
it returns. This will be the case with probability at least
1/q1. (10)
If this is not the case, the simulator would abort.
From (9) and (10), it is clear that with probability at least
 ·
(
1− qs(q2 + qs)
φ
)
· 1
q1
, (11)
the simulator obtains a recipient identity IDB and a ciphertext c from the adversary such that Verify(m, σ ′, IDA) = >
if (m, σ ′, IDA) is the result of decrypting c under the secret key corresponding to IDB. Since we assume that A has been
successful, IDB 6= IDA and we can use the decryption process of the simulator. If σ ′ = (U, σ ), the H2 query U ‖ mmust have
been made at some point during the simulation. We call this a critical query.
Next, the simulator chooses j← {1, . . . , q2 + qs} at random to solve the Diffie–Hellman problem. With probability
1/(q2 + qs), (12)
the value of j that we chose corresponds to the critical query.
From (11) and (12), and the splitting lemma from [20], with probability at least
 ·
(
1− qs(q2 + qs)
φ
)2
· 1
4q21(q2 + qs)2
, (13)
the simulated runs ofA give us two signatures (U, σ ) and (U, σ ′) onmwith the following properties. After the first run of
the simulation, there is an h′2 ∈ L2; and after the second run, there is an h′′2 ∈ L2 (the responses to the critical queries) such
that
σ = (r + h′2)abP and σ ′ = (r + h′′2)abP, (14)
where U = raP . Assuming that the simulations are successful, it is easy to see from (14) that at the last of the simulation,
abP = (h′2 − h′′2)−1(σ − σ ′) (15)
can be computed. The result follows from (13) and (15). 
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